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Richard G. Fentiman*

Jurisdiction, Discretion and the
Brussels Convention

In December 1990 the Court of Appeal in London addressed an issue of
cardinal importance for European private international law. The question was whether an English court has the power to stay or dismiss proceedings, in which it has jurisdiction under the 1968 Brussels
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement ofJudgments,I on the
basis that a court in a non-Convention country is the forum conveziens.
The case was Re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd.,2 and the Court of Appeal's
answer was that such a power exists.
Despite the complexity of the legal point in issue, the facts of Harrods are simply stated. A Swiss corporation, the minority shareholder in
Harrods (Buenos Aires) Limited, began proceedings in the English
courts, claiming that the company's affairs had been conducted in a
3
manner unfairly prejudicial to the minority shareholder's interests.
The primary relief sought was an order that the majority shareholder
should, in effect, compensate the minority shareholder for the diminution in the company's value caused by the alleged mismanagement. This
was to be done by ordering the majority shareholder to purchase the
minority holding at a price reflecting the alleged loss. In the alternative,
the court was asked to dissolve the company, not because it was insol* Fellow of Queens' College, University of Cambridge, Visiting Professor,
Corell Law School. Earlier versions of this paper were presented in seminars at
Cornell Law School, at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law,
and at a public lecture sponsored by Hambros Bank Ltd. I am grateful to Professors
Robert B. Kent and John J. Barcel6 of Cornell Law School, to Karl Newman of the
British Institute, and to Sir David Hancock and the Hon. Edward Adeane of Hambros
Bank, for their comments on those occasions. I am also indebted to Professor Erik
Jayme of the University of Heidelberg for many invaluable discussions of the
problems of international jurisdiction.
1. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 J.O. (L 299) 32, 29 I.L.M. 1417
[hereinafter Brussels Convention].
2. [1991] 3 W.L.R. 397 (Eng. C.A.). Curiously, the point at issue in Harrodswas
never addressed in Banco Atlantico S.A. v. British Bank of the Middle East [1990] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 504 (Eng. C.A.), in which an English-domiciled corporation sought to
defend English proceedings by claiming (unsuccessfully) that Sharjah was theforum
conveniens.
3. Companies Act 1985, § 459.
26 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 59 (1993)
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vent, but because to do so would be "just and equitable."'4 The majority
shareholder, another Swiss corporation, replied by inviting the English
court to exercise its discretion to stay the action, on the basis that
Argentina, not England, was the forum conveniens. The essence of this
defense was that the company operated entirely in Argentina, having
only the most formal connection with England by virtue of its incorporation there. Argentina, therefore, was the place where the case could be
tried "more suitably for the interests of all the parties and for the ends
of justice."'

In many cases this defense would be unexceptional. English courts
commonly stay proceedings on the basis that a court elsewhere is the
forum conveniens. In Harrods, however, the plea encountered an immediate difficulty. The company, effectively the defendant in the proceedings, was considered domiciled in England, pursuant to the Brussels
Convention, by the mere fact that it was incorporated and had its registered office there. 6 This in turn conferred jurisdiction on the English
court because Article 2 of the Convention provides that "[s]ubject to the
provisions of this Convention, persons domiciled in a Contracting State
shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that State."
Given that the "defendant" company was domiciled in England,
and caught by the Convention's jurisdictional regime, any attempt to
stay the proceedings was seriously impeded. The Convention, unlike
English national law, contains no doctrine offorum non conveniens. Nor,
indeed, does it provide at all for the staying of actions in cases where the
alternative forum is in a non-Convention country like Argentina. In
such circumstances how was an English court to treat the majority shareholder's move to stay the petition? Was the court permitted to resort to
its traditional rules for the staying of actions, which are curtailed by the
Convention but not abolished, regardless of the fact that it enjoyed
jurisdiction under the Convention? Or was it required to take Article 2
at face value and simply accept jurisdiction on the Convention's terms?
This stark choice was given focus by Section 49 of the CivilJurisdic4. Insolvency Act 1986, § 122.
5. Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd. (The Spiliada), [1986] 3 W.L.R.
972, 991 (Eng. H.L.) (per Lord Goff). Strictly speaking, the majority shareholder in
Harrods raised two procedural defenses, not one. Insofar as the proceedings were
against the company, over which the court clearly had jurisdiction, they sought a stay
of the petition. But, insofar as it involved the majority shareholder, the court was
asked to refuse to allow service of the petition on the majority shareholder in Switzerland under Order 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Although both issues
turned on the location of theforum conveniens, the latter begs distinct questions with
which the present article is not concerned. It is apparent from the questions referred
to the E.C.J. that the majority shareholder has assumed the role of co-defendant in
the House of Lords proceedings; infra note 8 (question 3).

6. See Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, ch. 27, § 42(3) (Eng.). The
Convention was implemented in the United Kingdom (U.K.) by the Civil Jurisdiction

and Judgments Act 1982, and amended (in the U.K.) by The Civil Jurisdiction and
Judgments Act 1982 (Amendment), S.I. 1990, No. 2591.
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tion and Judgments Act 1982, 7 the statute which implements the Brussels Convention in the United Kingdom. This provides that "[n]othing
in this Act shall prevent any court in the United Kingdom from staying,
sisting, striking out or dismissing any proceedings before it, on the
ground of forum non conveniens or otherwise, where to do so is not
inconsistent with the 1968 Convention." Everything turned, therefore,
on what the Convention itself required. The Court of Appeal, taking a
robust view of an elusive' problem, held that the Convention did not
prevent an English court from utilizingforum non conveniens in order to
stay proceedings against a non-Convention country.
Since the Court of Appeal's decision, the question at issue in Harrods has been appealed to the House of Lords, England's highest court.
The House of Lords, however, has adjourned its proceedings, as it was
bound to do. It has done so in order to refer the matter to the European
Court ofJustice ("E.C.J.") in Luxembourg which, though not a court of
appeal, is charged with providing definitive rulings on the interpretation
of the Convention. Of the six questions identified for the European
Court by the House of Lords, two, in particular, touch the nerve of the
case:
(1) Does the 1968 Convention apply to govern the jurisdiction of the
courts of a Contracting State in circumstances where there is no conflict
ofjurisdiction with the courts of any other Contracting State?
(2) (a) Is it inconsistent with the 1968 Convention where jurisdiction is
founded on Article 2 for a court of a Contracting State to exercise a discretionary power available under its national law to decline to hear proceedings brought against a person domiciled in that State in favour of the
courts of a non-Contracting State, if the jurisdiction of no other Contracting State under the 1968 Convention is in question?
is it inconsistent in all circumstances or only in some and,
(b) If so,
8
if so, which?
7. Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, supra note 6.
8. House of Lords, Minutes of Proceedings, July 13, 1992 (reproduced by permission of Her Majesty's Stationery Office). The other questions were:
(3)(a) If the answer to question (2) is Yes, is it nevertheless consistent with
the 1968 Convention for the court of a Contracting State to exercise a discretionary power available under its national law to decline to hear those proceedings against a co-defendant not domiciled in a Contracting State in
favour of the courts of a non-Contracting State?
(b) Is the answer to question (3) different if the effect of declining to hear
those proceedings against a co-defendant is that the claim against the domiciled defendant would have to be dismissed?
(4) Do proceedings in which a member of a company having its seat in a
Contracting State claims relief on the ground that the affairs of the company

are being or have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to
the interests of some of the members (including the claimant member) or
whether any actual or proposed act or omission of the company is or would
be so prejudicial, such as a claim under Part XVII of the UK Companies Act
1985, fall within Article 16(2) of the 1968 Convention.

(5) Do proceedings in which a claim is made that a company having its seat
in a Contracting State should be dissolved in the alternative to such a claim as
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Such questions are dramatic in their import. They address the very
purpose of the Brussels Convention and its territorial scope. They also
expose fundamental questions of policy and justice concerning English
law's distinctively discretionary approach to jurisdiction. The European
Court is unlikely, however, to answer the questions posed in Harrods
before the end of 1993, or even later. That being so, it is timely to open
discussion of the fundamental issues exposed in Harrods. And it is
appropriate to do so by examining the Court of Appeal's treatment of
the matter and its challenging implications.
I. The Problem in Context
To grasp the full significance of the issue exposed in Harrods, it is first
necessary to discuss the background of the case. In particular, it is
important to outline English law's approach to matters of international
jurisdiction and to explain precisely why the outcome of the Harrods litigation is so significant.
A. The English Approach to Jurisdiction
Two features of the English law of international jurisdiction require special attention. First, it should be noted that, depending on the case, no
fewer than three different sets of jurisdictional rules are available to
English courts, two of them contained in international conventions, the
third enshrined in the common law. Secondly, it must be emphasized
that the common law position on jurisdiction is profoundly different
from that provided for by international agreement.
1.

Three Regimes

Depending on the case, an English court may be obliged to apply one of
three mutually exclusive jurisdictional regimes. First, there are the rules
of the 1968 Brussels Convention. In force in the United Kingdom since
1987,9 the Convention substantially harmonizes the national laws of
European Community ("E.C.") countries concerning jurisdiction and
the enforcement of judgments. Mandatory in effect, the Convention
ensures that, in a situation in which an English court has jurisdiction
under the Convention, it must assume jurisdiction as the Convention
provides and not pursuant to its traditional rules of competence.
is referred to in question (4) have as their object the claim for dissolution so
as to bring them within Article 16(2) of the 1968 Convention?

(6) If the answer to question (4) or (5) is Yes, is it nevertheless consistent
with the 1968 Convention for a court of the Contracting State in which the
company has its seat to exercise a discretionary power available under its
national law to decline to hear such proceedings in favour of the courts of a
non-Contracting State, if the jurisdiction of no other Contracting State under
the 1968 Convention is in question?"
Id.

9. See Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, supra note 6.
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Of the several bases ofjurisdiction provided by the Convention the
most important in the present context is that contained in Article 2. As
we have seen, this provides, subject to some exceptions, that "persons
domiciled in a Contracting State shall, whatever their nationality, be
sued in the courts of that State." Each E.C. country may define domicile
in its own way. In English law, at least for Convention purposes, an
individual is domiciled in England if he or she is resident in, and has a
substantial connection with, England.' 0 A corporation is domiciled in
the United Kingdom if it is incorporated and has its registered office or
other official address there, or if its central management and control is
exercised there."
A second, quite distinct, jurisdictional regime is to be found in the
1988 Lugano Convention onJurisdiction and the Enforcement ofJudgments.1 2 It is similar in its terms to the Brussels Convention and, in
effect, extends the Brussels regime -to member states of the European
3
Free Trade Area.'
Thirdly, there are the traditional rules ofjurisdiction in English law.
These residual rules are allowed to operate in cases where neither the
Brussels nor Lugano Convention applies.' 4 According to the traditional
rules, a court may assume jurisdiction over any defendant on whom process may be served, either in England' 5 or overseas.16 But an arresting
feature of English law's traditional approach, of central importance in
the Harrodscase, is that whether an English court will entertain proceedings is ultimately in the courts' discretion. An English court may, in its
discretion, stay proceedings in which it has jurisdiction by virtue of the
defendant's presence; it may also refuse to permit service of process
upon a defendant located overseas.
The discretion whether or not to assume jurisdiction is governed by
the doctrine offorum non conveniens, the function of which is to identify
the forum in which the case may be tried "more suitably for the interests
of all the parties and the ends ofjustice.' 17 In connection with the staying of actions, the search for theforum conveniens in a given case normally
proceeds in two stages.' 8
10. Id. § 41.
11. Id.§42.
12. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988J.O. (L 319) 9, 28 I.L.M. 620 [hereinafter
Lugano Convention]. Implemented in the U.K. by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, ch. 12, 1991.
13. The "EFTA" states are Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. The issues described in the present article would be relevant mutatis mutandis
as much to the Lugano Convention as to the Brussels Convention although the cases
under discussion concern only the latter.
14. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 4.
15. Maharanee of Baroda v. Wildenstein [1972] 2 Q.B. 283 (Eng.).
16. The Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 11 (Eng.).
17. Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd. (The Spiliada), [1986] 3 W.L.R.
972, 991 (Eng. H.L.).

18. Id. at 991 et seq.
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First, a court is required to identify the natural forum for trial,
judged in practical and economic terms. Some relevant factors are the
convenience and expense of litigating in one place rather than another
(such as the availability of witnesses and the ease of proof), the identity
of the substantive governing law and the residence of the parties.
Assuming that the natural forum is found to be abroad, a stay of the
English proceedings will normally be granted.
It is, however, open to a plaintiff in such circumstances to invoke
the second stage of the test and argue that it would be unjust to grant a
stay. Justice in this sense usually means that the plaintiff would be
deprived of some significant juridical advantage which is unavailable in
the foreign forum. Examples of such a disadvantage which, if established, could cause an English court to decline a stay, might be: if the
action were time-barred abroad; 19 if an essential co-defendant were not
subject to the foreign court's jurisdiction; 20 if a successful plaintiff's
costs are irrecoverable abroad; 2 1 or if the plaintiff would be obliged to
proceed by way of a jury trial in foreign proceedings. 22 Such disadvantages are of an absolute nature - either a plaintiff's action is time-barred
in the alternative forum or not; either it can recover its costs abroad, or
not. There is, however, a tendency for English courts to downplay or
discount the significance of juridical disadvantages which are merely
matters of degree. Matters affecting the amount of financial recovery in
the competing fora, for example, such as a difference in the level of
damages, or the fact that interest is or is not recoverable, may not be
relevant. Differences in the extent of pre-trial discovery usually will be
considered irrelevant too.
The English doctrine offorum conveniens, therefore, seeks to reconcile the competing interests of plaintiffs and defendants as to the location of the forum. The first limb, focusing on the objective connection
between a dispute and a given jurisdiction, tends to protect defendants
from proceedings in an inappropriate or unconnected forum. The second limb, however, protects plaintiffs from any injustice that might follow from their being prevented from suing in their preferred court.
Thus depicted, the English approach to jurisdiction is discretionary,
placing the onus upon the court to allocate jurisdiction in terms of justice, convenience and the parties' best interests. It is also pragmatic,
defining jurisdiction purely in terms of the plaintiff's ability to serve process on the defendant. In these respects English law could not be more
different from the approach adopted in the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions.
19.
20.
(Eng.
21.
22.

Id.
S. & W. Berisford Plc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co. [1990] 3 W.L.R. 688, 703
Q.B. 1989).
Roneleigh Ltd. v. MII Exports Inc. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 619 (Eng. G.A.).
Berisford, [1990] 3 W.L.R. at 704.
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2. Two Approaches
Although the Brussels and Lugano Conventions share a common philosophy, even a common terminology, the English approach to international jurisdiction is distinct from both. At its simplest, the bases of
jurisdiction are quite different in English national law-domicile, for
example, was never a ground for jurisdiction in England. But two further differences are even more important in the present context. On the
one hand, the discretion which is the defining characteristic of the English approach is quite alien to both Conventions. A court which has
jurisdiction under either Convention may only decline jurisdiction in the
specific situations prescribed by the Conventions. Indeed, it must do so
in such situations; it has no choice and no discretion. The most important of these situations is one in which another E.C. country's courts are
already seised of the same matter. 2In
such a case, the second court must
3
decline jurisdiction automatically.
The second important difference between English law and the Brussels and Lugano Conventions is the direct source of the problem
presented in Harrods. Neither convention contains provisions which
deal with the staying of proceedings between an E.C. (or E.F.T.A.) country's courts and those in a non-Convention state. If an English court has
jurisdiction pursuant to the Convention, therefore, and a court in New
York also has jurisdiction (according to New York law) a problem arises:
the Brussels Convention provides no mechanism for an English court to
stay its proceedings in favor of proceedings in New York; the Convention makes no provision for allocating jurisdiction between E.C. countries and non-E.C. countries.
B. A Problem Revealed
The root of the problem in Harrods is the fact that the Brussels Convention lacks any mechanism for the staying of actions in cases in which the
alternative forum is outside the E.C.. It is a deficiency with troubling
implications. Suppose that a New York corporation wished to sue an
English-domiciled company in England. If the defendant is incorporated in England, it is domiciled there under the Brussels Convention
and so is subject to the English courts' jurisdiction. Imagine, however,
that the defendant alleges that New York represents theforum conveniens.
Perhaps the alleged default occurred in New York, such that the relevant
witnesses and evidence are located there, or maybe the applicable law is
that of New York, or possibly proceedings are substantially underway
there, such that it would be pointlessly expensive to re-commence litigation in England. Alternatively, there might be an express agreement in a
contract between the parties to submit their dispuies exclusively to the
New York courts. In any such case the defendant might have good reason to invoke English law's traditional rules and have the English action
23. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 21; Lugano Convention, supra note 12,

art. 21.
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stayed in favor of proceedings in New York. But, since the advent of the
Brussels Convention, are the English courts in a position to entertain
such a plea?
If, contrary to the Court of Appeal's view in Harrods, the answer is
no, the implications are serious, both for litigants and for the sound
administration of justice. If the English courts could no longer utilize
their traditional staying rules in such cases, the proceedings could not
be stayed at all because the Convention makes no alternative provision
for such an eventuality.
If suddenly the staying of actions is no longer a feature of such
cases, the balance of advantage between plaintiffs and defendants is to
some extent reversed. Plaintiffs would face one less obstacle while
defendants would be robbed of a valuable procedural defense. Moreover, a defendant's powerlessness to restrain the plaintiff in such circumstances could lead to injustice in some cases. Litigation in an
inconvenient forum is likely to be needlessly expensive and, although
the expense of inconvenient litigation will afflict both parties, its impact
on the financially weaker party will be more decisive. It is, of course, a
truism that the economic power of the parties tends to determine the
outcome of litigation more than the merits of a case. But it is, perhaps,
uniquely unfair to allow the outcome of a dispute to turn on inequality
of economic bargaining power when the defendant is the weaker party
and the forum is both substantially unconnected with the dispute and of
the plaintiff's choosing. Moreover, such considerations are especially
important in a system such as England's where the loser generally pays
the winner's costs. Would it be right to allow a well-funded plaintiff to
inflate needlessly the cost of a dispute by suing, inappropriately, in England, thus raising the stakes in the eyes of a poorer defendant for whom
the potential exposure would be crippling?
Apart from such considerations of justice, a number of important
policy objectives would be unattainable if the English courts were
deprived of their power to stay proceedings in a case such as Harrods.
First, their ability to police purely tactical forum-shopping would be
seriously impaired. Courts would find it harder to prevent plaintiffs
from commencing proceedings in England simply to disadvantage the
defendant, a concern which touches upon public policy as much as fair24
ness to the defendant.
Second, the English courts would be unable to ensure the most
cost-effective and time-efficient use of their own resources. They would
have no means to control the overloading of the English legal system
with proceedings which could be resolved as easily-or better
resolved-elsewhere.
Third, deprived of the power to stay actions in cases involving alternative proceedings in non-E.C. courts, the English courts would be
24. It would still be possible to stay proceedings which amount to an abuse of
process. See The Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 18.
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unable to prevent the mischief caused by encouraging concurrent proceedings in different jurisdictions. Apart from the economic inefficiency
inherent in simultaneous actions, both English and non-English courts
would find themselves involved in an unseemly race to judgment. Moreover, an English court, unable to stay its own proceedings, might find
itself eventually having to choose which of two inconsistent judgments it
should execute, one English, the other foreign.
C. The Significance of Harrods
The Harrods litigation, therefore, has serious implications in terms of
practice, policy and principle, implications which are all the more
profound given how often such cases are likely to arise. It is true that
there are some situations in which an English court remains free to
assume jurisdiction under its traditional rules and in such cases the Harrods problem would not arise. If a defendant has transitory presence in
England, for example, and if none of the Convention's jurisdictional
grounds apply, a court could assume jurisdiction-and stay proceedings-under its traditional rules. In the same way, if a case fell within
Order 11 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2 5 then, assuming the defendant
were not E.C.-domiciled, an English court could exercise its timehonoured discretion to assume jurisdiction over an overseas defendant.
Many cases, however, involve the issue whether an English court
may stay proceedings in which it has prima fade jurisdiction under the
Convention. In such cases jurisdiction is very likely to be founded on
domicile under Article 2 and the problem presented by Harrodswill arise
directly. This is because of the breadth with which domicile is defined
for Brussels Convention purposes. It is a concept broad enough to
embrace all corporations incorporated in England, 2 6 as well as some
which are not but have a "branch, agency or other establishment"
there.2 7 Moreover, when applied to individuals, the definition is notoriously inclusive, catching28 anyone who has been resident in England for
three months or more.
Against this background the significance of Harrodsis revealed. The
case exposes the most urgent of all questions concerning the meaning of
the Brussels Convention: does it apply at all in cases where an alternative forum exists in a non-E.C. country? It also challenges the assumption which most radically distinguishes the jurisdictional law of England
from that of its European neighbors: should judicial jurisdiction be
automatic or discretionary? At a more mundane level, however, Harrods
has more practical implications for potential litigants; if the European
Court ofJustice finds that the Court of Appeal is wrong it would signal
open season for forum shopping in the English courts. The volume of
international litigation in England would increase, and litigants would
25.
26.
27.
28.

See supra note 16.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 8 (relating to insurance contracts).
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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find the balance of advantage between them radically altered. Indeed
English law would be forced to move from a position in which the courts
act as impartial umpires, balancing the interests of the parties, to one in
which the odds are stacked dramatically in the plaintiff's favour. Harrods, therefore, is of prime importance, not only for scholars and practitioners of European law, but for all those who might have business
before the English courts.
II. The Harrods Controversy
The story which culminates in Harrods began with S & WBerisford v. New
HampshireInsuranceCo. 2 9 in which an English company sued its American
insurer in England over a claim which the latter had refused to pay. The
defendant was deemed domiciled in England under Article 2 of the
Brussels Convention because it had a branch there and the court
assumed jurisdiction on that basis. 30 When the defendant sought a stay
of the proceedings on the ground that New York, not London, was the
forum conveniens, Hobhouse J. held that the doctrine did not apply to a
case where a defendant is English-domiciled under the Convention.
The same view was taken in Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bryanston

InsuranceCo. Ltd.3 1 in which a Massachusetts insurance company sued its
English reinsurer in London. PotterJ. held that the latter was not entitled to seek a stay of the action under theforum conveniens doctrine on the
ground that there was a lis alibi pendens3 2 in New York. The English
court had jurisdiction because the defendant was domiciled in England,
so the case fell within the Brussels Convention's regime where no such
right existed.
In Harrods, the Court of Appeal emphatically disapproved of both
Arkwright and Berisford. This was despite the fact that Harrods (Buenos
Aires) Ltd., being incorporated in England, was undeniably domiciled
there under the Convention. The Court of Appeal never doubted that
the Brussels Convention prevents an English court from exercising its
discretion under the doctrine of forum conveniens where the alternative
forum is in a contracting state under the Convention. But they held that
the Convention does not stop a court from employing the doctrine
between the courts of England and those of a non-contracting state. A
majority of the Court of Appeal also held that proceedings in Argentina
were more appropriate, given that the company exclusively operated
33
there.
29. [1990] 3 W.L.R. 688 (Eng. Q.B. 1989).

30. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 8. Art. 8 has the effect of bringing
non-E.G. insurers within art. 2 in certain cases: "An insurer who is not domiciled in a
Contracting State but has a branch, agency or other establishment in one of the Contracting States shall, in disputes arising out of the operations of the branch, agency or

other establishment, be deemed to be domiciled in that State."
31. [1990] 3 W.L.R. 705 (Eng. Q.B.).
32. Literally a "pending action elsewhere."
33. [1991] 3 W.L.R. 397 (Eng. C.A.).
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An English Perspective

All three cases have attracted much comment and criticism. Arkwright
and Berisford provoked special concern among English practitioners.
Some were critical of the loss of England's flexible and commercially
attuned rules on the staying of actions. Others were dismayed that, by
implication, contractual clauses submitting to the jurisdiction of the
courts of a non-contracting state would be undermined if defendants in
such a case could no longer obtain a stay of English proceedings begun
in breach of such a clause. It is clear that neither Hobhouse nor Potter
JJ. thought that such a consequence would result from their rejection of
a power to stay in cases offorum non conveniens.3 4 It is far from obvious,
however, that cases involving foreign jurisdiction agreements can be so
readily distinguished from those concerning other types of stay. The
effect of Arkwright and Berisford was to put such jurisdiction clauses at
risk, if not actually to undermine them. Certainly, the fear of such a
possibility proved so powerfil that one suspects it was this, more than
anything, which led the Court of Appeal in Harrods to salvage theforum
conveniens doctrine from displacement by the Brussels Convention, even
35
though the case did not concern a jurisdiction clause.
B.

A Continental Perspective

The Court of Appeal's decision in Harrods, by contrast, has caused disquiet among continental European lawyers. They see in the decision, at
best, a failure to respect the spirit of the Brussels Convention, at worst,
an attempt to subvert it.36 They have doubts, on the one hand, about
34. Berisford, [1990] 3 W.L.R. at 699; Arkwright, [1990] 3 W.L.R. at 715.
35. See Harrods, [1991] 3 W.L.R. at 417 (the conclusion to Dillon L.J.'sjudgment);
see also Lawrence Collins, Forum Non Conveniens and the Brussels Convention, 106 L..
REV. 535 (1990).
36. For an especially acute view, see Hel6ne Gaudemet-Tallon, Le 'forum non con-

veniens," une menace pour las Convention de Bruxelles?, 80(3) REVUE CRlqUE DE DRorr
INTERNATIONAL PRIV9 [R.C.D.I.P.] 80(3) (juill.-sept. 1991). See also Peter Schlosser,
Report on the Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and CommercialMatters, 1979 O.J. (C 59)
76-78, 17677 [hereinafter Schlosser Report]. The Schlosser Report has special status in relation to the Convention. Section 3(3) of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act
1982 says that it "may be considered in ascertaining the meaning or effect of any
provision of the Conventions and shall be given such weight as is appropriate in the
circumstances." The Schlosser Report is silent on the question of the power of an
E.C. country's courts to stay proceedings in favor of those in a non-E.C. country.
English commentators tend to support the Court of Appeal's stance: see TREVOR C.
HARTLEY, CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS 77 (1984); LAWRENCE COLLINS, CIVIL
JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS ACT 1982 97 (1983); ALBERT DicEy & H. C. MORRIS,
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 400 (11th ed. 1987); STEVEN O'MALLEY & ALEXANDER LAYTON, EUROPEAN CIVIL PRACTICE 30 (1989); PETER KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGNJUDGMENTS

1244-45 (1987). But see P. M. North, The Brus-

sels Convention and Forum Non Conveniens, 12 IPRAx 183 (1992); David W. Robertson,
Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: "A Rather FantasticFiction," 103 L.Q.
REV. 398 (1987).
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the Court of Appeal's handling of the Convention and, on the other,
about the very idea of jurisdictional discretion.
There are several ways to argue that the Brussels Convention
deprives the English courts of their power to employ their traditional
staying rules in a case such as Harrods, contrary to the Court of Appeal's
view. The stronger argument is that once an English court has jurisdiction under the Convention, only the Convention can remove it; what the
Convention giveth, the Convention taketh away. This might be justified
with regard to Harrods by appealing to the apparently mandatory language of Article 2: someone domiciled in a Contracting State shall be
sued there unless the Convention itself provides otherwise. Alternatively, we might say that, once an English court has jurisdiction under
the Convention, a plaintiff has a right to sue in England and a defendant
has a right to be sued there, rights which cannot be abrogated save as
the Convention provides. Whatever form the argument takes, however,
the idea that only the Convention can restrict Convention jurisdiction
has dramatic consequences. It means, as the Convention does not provide for the staying of proceedings as between contracting and non-contracting states, that an English court would have no power at all to grant
a stay in such a situation.
The weaker version of the anti-Harrods position argues that a contracting state's courts may stay proceedings in such a case pursuant to its
national law, but only on grounds regarded as acceptable by the Convention for intra-E.C. cases. The point here is not that Convention
jurisdiction can only be abrogated as providedfor by the Convention but
that this is permissible only in so far as it is consistent with the Convention.
By this account, it would have been proper for the court in Harrods to
have stayed the action had there been a related pending action in Argentina, had the case concerned immovable property situated there, or had
there been an Argentinean jurisdiction clause. To have done so would
have been to mirror, if not to apply, the terms, respectively, of Articles
21, 16 and 17 of the Convention. According to this argument, however,
to decide, as did the Court of Appeal in Harrods, that English proceedings can be stayed merely because the forum conveniens is elsewhere, is
improper. Such a ground for staying an action is not available in the
Convention for intra-E.C. cases and therefore, so the argument runs,
should not be allowed in a non-Brussels situation.
As for the disquiet about jurisdictional discretion itself, there is anxiety outside England about the apparent breadth and uncertainty of such
an approach. The heart of this concern is that jurisdictional rules
should be clearly defined and automatic, not dependent on judicial
choice. Some regard such discretion as a recipe for uncertainty and
arbitrariness, or simply doubt that a judge could ever be competent
enough to balance justice and convenience as the doctrine offorum non
conveniens requires. More compellingly, others see in jurisdictional discretion the risk that a court will be tempted to abdicate its responsibility
to try a case of which it is properly seised. Put differently, it gives a
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judge the power to interfere retrospectively with the rights of litigants to
sue and be sued in a court which primafacie has jurisdiction over them.
Such misgivings are most conspicuously encapsulated in the German
Constitution which provides that "no one shall be deprived of access to
his lawful judge," 3 7 an injunction which ensures, once it can be shown
that a plaintiff has a right to sue somewhere, that nothing can undermine
that right, least of all an exercise ofjudicial discretion.
C.

A Via Media

In light of these concerns, the purpose of the following remarks is to
place the Arkwright-Berisford-Harrodssaga in perspective and to suggest
how the competing interests which those cases reflect might eventually
be reconciled. More specifically, proceeding by way of a critique of the
Court of Appeal's handling of Harrods, the present article speaks to the
anxiety of those who doubt that resort to jurisdictional discretion, and to
the forum conveniens doctrine in particular, even against non-contracting
states, is compatible with the Brussels Convention. Its conclusion is
that, on the contrary, such discretion, and the doctrine offorum conveniens
in particular, offers the best and perhaps the only means whereby the
objectives of the Convention might be furthered in the English context.
Before proceeding, however, it should be noted that the present
article makes some assumptions, and so begs some questions. First, it
says nothing about whether the Brussels Convention should operate
where both the parties in dispute are English-domiciled. Whether it
should depends on how we are to understand the reference in its Preamble to the fact that the Convention's purpose is to govern the "international" jurisdiction of E.C. courts.3 8 Does this exclude from its scope
cases in which both parties are English? If so, does a dispute between
English domiciliaries acquire nonetheless an international dimension
whenever the defendant alleges that trial should take place in another
country? Whatever the solution to these intractable questions the present article assumes that these aspects of the Convention's scope are not
in issue (as they were not in Harrods).
Secondly, the following discussion assumes that the issue at stake in
Harrods is not merely whether a defendant in English proceedings can
seek a stay on the ground that theforum conveniens is elsewhere. Rather,
the issue is whether the entire corpus of English law's traditional, discretionary rules for staying proceedings can survive when an English court
has jurisdiction under the Convention and it is alleged that the courts in
a non-contracting state should hear the dispute instead. Without entering into any debate as to the breadth of the doctrine offorum non conveniens, the following remarks take for granted that the question begged
37. GRUNDGESETZ [GG], art. 101(1).
38. See P. Jenard, Report on the Convention on Jurisdictionand the Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1979 OJ. (C 59) 8 [hereinafter Jenard Report];
Schlosser Report, supra note 36, at 123; COLLINS, supra note 36, at 17; HARTLEY, supra

note 36, at 41.
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in Harrods affects cases concerning lis
alibi pendens and foreign jurisdiction clauses as much as cases of "bare" forum non conveniens. All these
situations share the characteristic that they require an English court to
exercise jurisdictional discretion.

m. Three Misconceptions
It is important to scotch three possible misconceptions about the meaning of the Court of Appeal's decision in Harrods. The first concerns the
interface between the Brussels Convention and the common law. In this
regard it is important to note that the Court of Appeal was not claiming
a discretion to stay proceedings as between England and other contracting states, a situation dealt with quite differently in the Convention
by Article 21.39 Nor did the court mean to say that the Convention conferred such a power upon them vis-d-vis non-contracting states. What
they said was that the Convention is simply inapplicable to a case where
a defendant seeks to stay English proceedings on the ground that the
forum conveniens is located in a non-contracting state. A court need not,
so to speak, switch exclusively into Convention mode simply because it
has jurisdiction under Article 2.
A second misconception about the Court of Appeal's approach is
that it somehow represents a rejection of the Convention. In fact, as we
shall see, it was the Convention itself upon which the court relied in
justifying its decision.
Thirdly, there might be some misunderstanding about the nature of
jurisdictional discretion itself, the role of which the Court of Appeal so
stoutly protected in Harrods. Typically this takes two forms. Observers
sometimes suppose that the doctrine confers an untrammelled discretion on English judges to allocate jurisdiction at will. And sometimes
they assume that a discretionary power to dismiss proceedings in which
a court enjoys primafacie jurisdiction is necessarily unjust to the disappointed plaintiff.
A. The Nature of Jurisdictional Discretion
It is easy to imagine that the doctrine offorum non conveniens confers on
an English judge complete freedom to decide whether a case should be
tried in England or abroad, assuming the English courts have jurisdiction in the first place. Certainly, the usual, extremely open-textured,
formulations of the doctrine are apt to suggest that whether a court will
entertain proceedings depends on some open-ended balancing of all the
circumstances of the case. The courts' task is said to be to locate the
"appropriate forum for the trial of the action, i.e. in which the case may
be tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of
39. Article 21 provides that any court other than that first seised of a matter shall
automatically declinejurisdiction; cf Aiglon Ltd. v. Gau Shan Co. Ltd.,June 23, 1992
(unreported) (Eng. Q.B.).
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justice." 40 This is usually taken to mean, equally unspecifically, that the
forum conveniens is the "natural forum," which itself is broadly defined as
"that with which the action had the most real and substantial
41

connection."
If such open-ended formulae are all there is to the forum conveniens
doctrine then it would be true, as continental lawyers often suppose,
that the staying of actions in such cases is unpredictable, allowing the
judge a free hand to allocate jurisdiction. Thus depicted, English law
would be far from the certainty and precision of the Brussels Convention. In reality, however, the exercise of jurisdictional discretion or,
more exactly, the framework of principle according to which it is exercised, is tolerably predictable in practice. The courts apply sensible presumptions, sometimes unstated but readily implied, as to what
constitutes the most appropriate forum in a given type of case. Consider their treatment of the two areas of law which occasion most litigation. In tort proceedings the natural forum is usually regarded as that of
the place where the wrong was committed, 4 2 while in contract cases
there is a growing tendency to regard the identity of the applicable law
4
as an especially potent indicator of the forum conveniens. 3
When the question arises whether a plaintiff would be robbed of a
significant juridical advantage, were he or she compelled to sue in a foreign forum, it is especially clear that the courts have begun to impose a
discernible structure on an otherwise elusive enquiry. An invidious
comparison between the quality of service offered in competingfora is,
for example, impermissible. 44 So too, disadvantages which amount to
mere matters of degree are unlikely to count for this purpose; a difference in the level of damages or in the extent of discovery, will usually be
irrelevant. 4 5 Moreover, of those "absolute" disadvantages which are
regarded as relevant, it is apparent that some will be treated by the
courts as especially persuasive reasons to withhold a stay of English proceedings. The impossibility ofjoining a co-defendant in the alternative
forum is one illustration. 46 Others are the fact that proceedings are
40. Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd. (The Spiliada), [1986] 3 W.L.R.
972, 985 (Eng. H.L.) (per Lord Goff).

41. Id. at 987.
42. Cordoba Shipping Co. Ltd. v. National State Bank, Elizabeth, New Jersey
[1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 91 (Eng. C.A.); Metall und RohstoffA.G. v. Donaldson Lufkin
&Jenrette Inc., [1989] 3 W.L.R. 563 (Eng. C.A.).
43. Muduroglu Ltd. v. T.G. Ziraat Bankasi, [1986] 3 W.L.R. 606 (Eng. C.A.); Sea-

shell Shipping Corp. v. Mutualidid de Seguros del Instituto Nacional de Industria,
[1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 47 (Eng. C.A. 1988); Banco Atlantico SA v. The British Bank of
the Middle East, [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 504 (Eng. C.A.); Standard Steamship Owners,
Protection Indemnity Association (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Gann, Financial Times, June 19,

1992 (Eng. C.A.).
44. The Abidin Daver, [1984] 2 W.L.R. 196, 202 (Eng. H.L.).

45. Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd. (The Spiliada), [1986] 3 W.L.R.
972, 991-92 (Eng. H.L.).

46. S.& W. Berisford Plc. v. New Hampshire Ins., [1990] 3 W.L.R. 688, 702-03
(Eng. Q.B. 1989).
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time barred in the alternative forum, 47 and the fact that even a victori48
ous plaintiff could not recover its costs in any foreign proceedings.
More obviously, perhaps, two especially important principles
underpin the courts' approach to the staying of actions. First, a court
will almost invariably stay English proceedings which have been brought
in breach of a foreign jurisdiction clause. Strictly speaking, it is an open
question whether the discretion to stay English proceedings in favor of a
foreign jurisdiction clause is an application of the doctrine offorum non
conveniens.49 The courts seem undecided on the issue but, whatever the
correct view, the point is the same. The staying of proceedings begun in
defiance of a foreign jurisdiction clause is virtually automatic in English
law, reflecting the courts' respect for such agreements. 50 Their discretion in such cases is hardly a hazard to certainty and justice.
Again, there is powerful evidence that a court will tend to stay English proceedings when there is a prior pending action abroad. 5 1 This
presumption is less secure than that governing the enforcement ofjurisdiction agreements as the foreign proceedings will have to be some way
advanced for it to operate. 52 But in this situation, as elsewhere, it seems
that the doctrine of forum conveniens is more rule-like and regular than
discretionary and unpredictable.
Whether we dignify such regularities of judicial behavior by referring to them as presumptions, or whether we treat them as informal
starting points in the forum conveniens enquiry, the effect is the same.
They render the lineaments of the courts' jurisdictional discretion relatively concrete and predictable. Indeed, the record seems to support
Bingham L.J.'s recent assessment of the courts' discretion inforum conveniens cases. Admitting that the final answer to the question whether
one forum or another is more appropriate must always be discretionary,
he said nonetheless that "Even the answer to [that question] is not
wholly discretionary, since the question itself is defined by authority and
47. Spiliada, [1986] 3 W.L.R. at 992-93 (assuming it is reasonable for the plaintiff

to have failed to proceed abroad).
48. Roneleigh Ltd. v. MII Exports Inc., [1989] 1 W.L.R. 619 (Eng. C.A.).
49.

P.M. NORTH &JJ.

FAWCETr, CHESHIRE AND NORTH'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL

LAw 239 (11 th ed. 1987); see also Berisford, [1990] 3 W.L.R. at 702 (Hobhouse J.'s

treatment of the jurisdiction clause).
50. The Eleftheria, [1970] P. 94 (Eng. 1969); J. Braconnot et cie. v. Compagnie
des Messageries Maritimes, [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 372 (Eng. C.A. 1974); The

Makefjell, [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 29 (Eng. C.A.); The Biskra, [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 59
(Eng. Q.B.); The Indian Fortune, [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 344 (Eng. Q.B.); S. & W.
Berisford Plc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., [1990] 3 W.L.R. 688 (Eng. Q.B. 1989). A
residual power to grant a stay naturally remains: Ararra Potato Co. Ltd. v. Egyptian
Navigation Co., [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 119 (Eng. C.A.); D.S.V. Silo-Und Verwaitungs-

Gesellschaft M.B.H. v. Owners of The Sennar, [1985] 1 W.L.R. 490 (Eng. H.L.).
51. The Hagen, [1908] P. 189, 202 (Eng.); G.A.F. Corporation v. Amchem Products Inc., [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 601 (Eng. C.A.); The Abidin Daver, [1984] 2 W.L.R.
196 (Eng. H.L.); Cleveland Museum of Art v. Capricorn Art International S.A.,
[1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 166 (Eng. Q.B. 1989).

52. Arkwright Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bryanston Ins. Co., [1990] 3 W.L.R. 705, 720
(Eng. Q.B.).
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there is clear authoritative guidance on the matters which may and may
not be considered in answering it."53
In fact, it would be surprising if this were not so, given the background against which most matters of international jurisdiction are
decided in England. The majority of such issues arise before the Commercial Court in London, a relatively small tribunal whose judges are
drawn exclusively from the ranks of the court's most experienced practitioners. Those practitioners in turn tend to appear regularly in the
Commercial Court, acquiring considerable insight into the thinking of
the bench and much experience as to the matters which might or might
not be successfully argued. The collegiality of such a system nurtures a
potent conventional wisdom as to how the appropriateness of the forum
is to be determined.
Again, it is important to appreciate how seriously English judges
take the ever-present injunction to decide like cases alike, and unlike
cases unlike. Indeed, in the present context as elsewhere, the constant
process of reconciling and distinguishing past cases in an effort to identify similarities and differences between them ensures that principles are
bound to emerge the more the court's discretion is exercised. Finally, it
should not be forgotten that English judges, unlike many of their continental European counterparts, always give lengthy, fully reasoned judgments. This ensures that their jurisdictional discretion is almost bound
to be applied consistently between different cases, because the reasoning is always entirely exposed. It also makes it relatively simple for lawyers to discern regularities in the courts' approach to such questions and
lends a far greater degree of consistency to the process than those familiar with continental adjudication might suppose.
Thus presented, it is intriguing how closely English law resembles
the Brussels Convention in form and spirit. English law, in the end,
looks less discretionary and less unpredictable than superficially
appears. Even if it is different from the Brussels regime, it is actually
closer to it than might appear. Moreover, English law employs its distinctive approach to achieve many of the same policy objectives as the
Convention. Preserving the security of jurisdiction agreements, 5 4 and
deferring to a court already seised of a matter so as to prevent concurrent proceedings, 55 are features of English law as much as the Convention. Such objectives can be achieved under English law, however,
precisely because the acceptance ofjurisdiction is discretionary.
53. Banco Atlantico S.A. v. British Bank of the Middle East, [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
504, 506 (Eng. C.A.); Cf Nourse L.J.'s remarks to similar effect, id. at 511:

Where an English court is asked, on the ground offorum non conveniens, to stay
an action, a start must be made somewhere; and, where the action is for

breach of a contract whose existence is admitted or established, a start can
only be made by identifying the proper law of the contract...
54. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 17.

55. Id. art. 2 1.
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B. Justice and Disappointed Plaintiffs
A final misconception about what Harrods portends for the Brussels
Convention relates to the supposed injustice of depriving a plaintiff of
the opportunity to sue in a forum which has primafacie jurisdiction over a
plaintiff's claim. It is sometimes said that, because a plaintiff has a right
under the Convention to sue a defendant where the defendant is domiciled, it would be unjust to the plaintiff to dismiss proceedings, a result
which the doctrine offorum non conveniens permits, even encourages. As
we shall see, the idea of a right to sue in this context is troubling, even
incoherent. There is another reason, however, why injustice to the
plaintiff fails to ring true as a criticism ofjurisdictional discretion. It is
hardly plausible, in the real world at least, that a plaintiff would be
aggrieved merely through being deprived of the chance to sue in the
courts of the defendant's domicile. Nor would it be unfair to prevent a
plaintiff from vindicating a mere paper right, so to speak, to sue the
defendant there. A plaintiff would rightly be aggrieved, however, and it
would be unfair, if the plaintiff were deprived of a significant advantage
available in the courts of the defendant's domicile because the action
there was stayed.
Suppose, for example, that no other court would have jurisdiction
over the plaintiff's claim, either because of lack ofjurisdictional competence, or because the claim is time-barred in the only alternative forum.
Again, what if the system for recovering costs in the alternative forum is
such that the plaintiff's net gain in the event of victory would be less
abroad than in England? And what if the plaintiff would be forced to
submit to a jury trial in the foreign court although in England the trial
would be by judge alone? In such cases, and in others of a similar
nature, it would be unjust to rob a plaintiff of the opportunity to sue in
the courts of a defendant's domicile by staying the proceedings. This is
not, however, because in some abstract sense the plaintiff's right to sue
has been infringed; rather it is because the plaintiff would be disadvantaged by the stay.
If the doctrine offorum non conveniens compelled such results, its justice and credibility would indeed be jeopardized. In reality, however,
instead of requiring such results, the doctrine actually guards against
them. It does so, moreover, in a fashion which could hardly be more
sensitive to the potential injustice of staying a plaintiff's action. The
doctrine accomplishes this by ensuring that a stay of English proceedings will not deprive a plaintiff of a significant juridical advantage by
forcing the plaintiff into a foreign forum.5 6 In practice, this tends to
mean that an English court will stay its proceedings in favor of a trial in
an alternative forum on the condition that the defendant waives
56. Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd. (The Spiliada), [1986] 3 W.L.R.
972, 991-93 (Eng. H.L.). See generally Peter Schlosser,Jurisdictionin InternationalLitigation-The Issue of Human Rights in Relation to NationalLaw and to the Brussels Convention,
64 RIvISTA DI DiRrrro INTERNAZIONALE 5 (1991) (on the human rights aspect ofjurisdictional rules).
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whatever feature of the foreign procedure would disadvantage the plaintiff. Where such undertakings are impracticable, or where the defendant
refuses to comply, the stay will simply be refused and the plaintiff wil be
allowed to proceed.
The English courts are developing considerable expertise in the
area of determining whether a plaintiff would be disadvantaged by a
stay. Recent examples of such a disadvantage include the existence of a
time bar in the alternative forum, 57 and the difficulty of joining a codefendant in any foreign proceedings.5 8 The impossibility of recovering
costs from a defendant abroad, 5 9 and the fact that a plaintiff would have
to proceed by way of a jury trial in the alternative forum have been similarly treated. 60 Moreover, the sensitivity of the English courts' approach
is implied by the importance they attach to the circumstances of particular cases when assessing any injustice to the plaintiff. The fact that the
plaintiff's claim is time-barred in the foreign forum will only count as a
disadvantage, for example, if it was reasonable for the plaintiff not to
have issued proceedings abroad in good time. 6 1 Similarly, the fact that a
successful plaintiff's costs are irrecoverable from a defendant in the
alternative forum will not always be a significant disadvantage. Only if
the likely award of damages is small62will the impact of a plaintiff's having
to fund its own case be so treated.
In light of such considerations it is hard to allege that the doctrine
offorum non conveniens causes injustice to a plaintiff who would otherwise
be entitled to sue in the courts of a defendant's domicile. On the contrary, the doctrine is designed precisely to protect plaintiffs from such a
threat. In this respect, as in others, therefore, it seems that the English
doctrine is immune from the criticism that it betrays the goals of the
Brussels Convention. Indeed, it respects the ideal of justice for the
plaintiff better than the practice of invariably allowing a plaintiff to sue
in the place of the defendant's domicile; for, unlike that approach, it will
only protect a plaintiff when justice actually requires it.
IV. Harrods Justified
There is much to approve of in the Court of Appeal's approach in
Harrods. First and foremost, it correctly reflects the spirit and intent of
the Brussels Convention itself. It was never the Convention's purpose
to harmonize in their entirety the laws of contracting countries in rela57. Spiliada, [1986] 3 W.L.R. at 992-93 (the plaintiff must have acted reasonably
in not issuing proceedings in time); The Bintang Bolong, March 21, 1988
(unreported).
58. S. &W. Berisford Plc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., [1990] 3 W.L.R. 688, 702703 (Eng. Q.B. 1989).
59. Roneleigh Ltd. v. MII Exports Inc., [1989] 1 W.L.R. 619 (Eng. C.A.).
60. Berisford, [1990] 3 W.L.R. at 704.
61. Spiliada, [1986] 3 W.L.R. at 993.
62. Arkwright Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bryanston Ins. Co. Ltd., [1990] 3 W.L.R. 705,
724 (Eng. Q.B.).
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tion to jurisdiction and the enforcement of foreign judgments, despite
dicta to the contrary in other cases. 63 Moreover, nothing in the Convention prevents national courts from using their existing rules in such matters when to do so would not be inconsistent with its terms;64 English
courts are free to assume jurisdiction over defendants not domiciled
there and to enforce judgments rendered outside the E.C. Instead, the
avowed purpose of the Convention is simply to facilitate the enforcement of judgments as between contracting states. 6 5 This necessitates
removing the possibility of concurrent, inconsistent proceedings in
more than one such country, which is why the Convention imposes a
degree of uniformity between the bases ofjurisdiction employed by contracting states. Such uniformity is unnecessary, however, and was never
contemplated by the Convention in cases involving alternative proceedings outside the E.C. 6 6 By definition, such cases do not pose the threat
of conflicting E.C. judgments.
Second, as we have seen, it is the policy of the Convention, albeit as
between contracting states, both to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings, 6 7 and to prevent a party to a contractual jurisdiction clause from
walking away from the agreement. 68 It is precisely these policies, however, which are served vis-d-vis non-contracting states by allowing an
English court to stay proceedings under English law's traditional rules.
Indeed, to deny an English court the power to pursue these policies by
employing its usual discretion in a non-Convention case would be to
condone an anomaly, since it would be inconsistent for an English court
to endorse such policies in a case within the Convention, but not where
the alternative forum is a non-contracting state. Arguably, the Convention was not designed to produce such a Euro-centric and irrational
result.
Third, those who drafted the Brussels Convention could hardly
have intended to deprive the English courts of any power to stay proceedings in a case such as Harrods. This might have been the strange
and alarming consequence, however, had the Court of Appeal chosen to
take the Arkwright-Berisford approach to its logical conclusion. For if an
English court has no power to employ jurisdictional discretion, it has no
power to order a stay at all, even in the presence of a foreign jurisdiction
clause or lis alibipendens. Whatever the case, the exercise of discretion is
the only mechanism known to English law for effecting a stay of proceedings under its traditional rules.
Critics of the Court of Appeal's decision might object at this point
that their hostility is not directed against the possibility of staying pro63. E.g., Berisford, [1990] 3 W.L.R. at 701.
64. Art. A; Civil Jurisdiction andJudgments Act, 1982, supra note 6, ch. 27, § 49.
65. See Brussels Convention, supra note 1, preamble; TREATY ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EEC TREATY) art. 220; Jenard Report, supra note
38, at 7; Schlosser Report, supra note 36, 78.
66. See Re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd, [1991] 3 W.L.R. 397, 416 (Eng. C.A.).
67. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, arts. 21, 23.
68. Id art. 17.
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ceedings per se but at the discretionary form this takes in England. As we
have seen, they would have the English courts stay proceedings in nonBrussels cases on an automatic basis in prescribed situations, reflecting
the scheme of Articles 16, 17 and 21 of the Convention. In response, it
can be said that it would be entirely feasible, of course, to introduce
such an approach into English law by statute, assuming it were thought
desirable. But it would be quite impossible to expect the courts to do so
by themselves. The Court of Appeal in Harrods could certainly have
decided that the Convention prevents staying proceedings in such cases.
But they were in no position positively to redesign English law at a
stroke by introducing something akin to the rules contained in Articles
16, 17 and 21. Indeed, had they done so this would have involved precisely that judicial arbitrariness which critics wrongly associate with
jurisdictional discretion.
Fourth, the Brussels Convention aside, it is the policy of the common law, and sound policy by any standards, to seek to avoid multiple
proceedings in the same matter in different jurisdictions. As the House
of Lords indicated in The Abidin Daver,6 9 the duplication of proceedings
is wasteful, inefficient, and leads to an "ugly rush" to judgment 7° by the
respective parties in each jurisdiction. It also exposes an English court
to the awkwardness of being asked to enforce a foreign judgment which
might be inconsistent with an existing English decision on the same
point.7 1 Staying an English action where another more appropriate
forum is available, as permitted by Harrods but prevented by Arkwright
and Berisford, is a way to minimize such difficulties.
Fifth, it is also quite clearly the policy of the common law to uphold
contractually agreed jurisdiction clauses by staying English proceedings
brought in defiance of such a clause. 72 This power might have been
lost, however, had Arkwright and Berisford been followed. Indeed, in this
regard the Harrods decision will come as a relief to those who negotiate
and draft international commercial agreements. The effect of denying
an English court any power to stay an action where the defendant is
domiciled in England would have been seriously to undermine the stability of jurisdiction clauses in such transactions. It might have robbed
the court of its power to stay proceedings on the ground that such a
clause nominated the courts of another country as the chosen forum
where that country was a non-contracting state. Suppose, for example,
that a New York corporation had made a contract with an English company, and that agreement had included a New York jurisdiction clause.
If the former had sued the latter in England then, taking Arkwright and
Berisford to their logical conclusion, the court would probably have been
powerless to order a stay on the ground that the agreed forum was elsewhere. Since Harods, however, such clauses are once again secure.
69. [1984] 2 W.L.R. 196 (Eng. H.L.).
70. Id. at 214 (per Lord Brandon).
71. Id. at 201 (per Lord Diplock); 214 (per Lord Brandon).
72. See cases cited supra note 50.
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Finally, the Court of Appeal's decision successfully avoids the

seductive trap of too literal an interpretation of Article 2 of the Brussels
Convention. For, in the end, whatever other reasons Hobhouse and
Potter JJ. might have had for deciding as they did in Arkwright and Berisford, one suspects they were forgivably beguiled by the mandatory language of Article 2 itself. As the Court of Appeal made clear, however,
the wording of Article 2 must be read in context and, so read, Article 2 is
quite consistent with the Court of Appeal's decision. If we read Article 2
in the light of the Convention's overall structure and purpose, it is
apparent, as we have seen, that it would not further the Convention's

objectives to curb the English courts' discretion as Arkwright and Berisford
suggest.
V.

Doubts About Harrods

To find virtue in the Court of Appeal's decision in Harods is not, however, to endorse it wholeheartedly. The Court of Appeal's approach
gives cause for concern in five respects.
A.

Slight Irony

First, there is some irony in the fact that the court clearly felt that the
decision was a defense of England's pragmatic, commercially-led jurisdictional rules. More precisely, although their decision was partly
inspired by a desire to uphold express jurisdiction agreements, by
allowing English courts to stay proceedings brought in defiance of such
a clause, its effect might be the opposite. It opens the way to challenging an English jurisdiction agreement, even one which confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the English courts under Article 17, on the ground
that a court elsewhere is the forum conveniens. It is highly unlikely that an
English court would find that it is not theforum conveniens in such a case.
But the very fact that it is open to a defendant to argue otherwise puts
the plaintiff, and the court, to the trouble and expense of resolving the
matter. However valuable forum non conveniens might be in identifying
the appropriate forum, its use is inapt where the appropriate forum is
clearly discernible.
B.

Some Unanswered Questions

Although Harrods is probably a correct decision, the way the case was
argued begs intriguing questions. It is curious, for example, that the
petitioners apparently never relied upon Article 16(2) of the Convention, relating to the dissolution of corporations, which might have conferred not merely jurisdiction on the English court, but exclusive
jurisdiction. 73 It is, of course, true that Article 16(2) does not extend to
73. Article 16(2) provides that the courts of the EC country in which a corporation has its seat shall have exclusive jurisdiction "in proceedings which have as their
object ... the dissolution of companies ....
The relevance of Article 16 is, however, an issue before the House of Lords, see supra note 8.
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the winding up of insolvent companies because matters of insolvency
are excluded from the Convention.7 4 But the petitioners in Harrods
sought the company's dissolution on the ground that it was "just and
equitable" 75 and its solvency was never doubted. Curious as this omission appears, however, it might be explained on two grounds. On the
one hand, the company's dissolution was not the petitioners' preferred
relief and not, presumably, their main concern. Their principal contention was that the majority shareholder should buy out their interest at a
compensatory rate. Again, reliance on Article 16(2) might not, in the
end, have improved the petitioner's case. It might not have seemed a
stronger argument than reliance upon the company's domicile in England under Article 2 as the basis of the English court's jurisdiction; Article 16(2) might have appeared as vulnerable as Article 2 to the argument
that the Convention does not operate vis-d-vis non-contracting states.
A more controversial issue is whether the majority shareholder in
Harrods might profitably have relied on a series of decisions of the European Court of Justice to the effect that the courts of contracting states
are free to apply their national procedural rules to supplement thejurisdictional rules of the Brussels Convention. 76 Especially notable by its
77
absence is any reference to Kongress Agentur Hagen Gmbh v. Zeehaghe B. V
which would seem, at first sight, to support the idea that English courts
retain a discretion to stay proceedings notwithstanding that they have
jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention. The case, it must be
emphasized, concerned the allocation ofjurisdiction between two E.C.
courts. It could be argued, however, that the decision must apply afortiori to a case such as Harrods; if forum non conveniens operates as between
E.C. countries it certainly would apply as against non-E.C. countries.
Zeehaghe had sued Hagen in the Netherlands for canceling hotel
reservations it had made on behalf of a third party, another German
company. Hagen sought to join the third party under Article 6(2) of the
Convention which allows an E.C.-domiciled third party to be joined in
proceedings in which another E.C. domiciliary is defendant. Zeehaghe
objected to thejoinder on the basis that it would make its action against
Hagen more complicated and protracted. The Dutch Hoge Raad sought
an E.C.J. ruling on the question whether it was permissible for the Dutch
courts to refuse to order the third party to appear in the proceedings as
guarantor of Hagen's obligations, as Zeehaghe had argued, given that
Article 6(2) applied to the case. The E.CJ. ruled that a court in a Contracting state can apply its own procedural rules to determine whether
74. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 1.
75. Insolvency Act 1986, § 122.

76. Case 129/83, Zelger v. Salinitri, 1984 E.C.R. 2397, 2408; Case 148/84,
Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank v. Brasserie du Pecheur SA, 1985 E.C.R. 1981, 1992;
Case 145/86, Hoffmann v. Kreig, 1988 E.C.R. 645, 670.
77. Case 365/88, 1990 E.C.R. 1845; see also Adrian Briggs, Spiliada and the Brussels
Convention, 12 Lloyd's Mar. Com. L.Q. 10 (1991); Adrian Briggs, Forum Non Conveniens
and the Brussels Convention, Again, 107 L.Q. Rev. 180 (1991); P. M. North, The Brussels
Convention and Forum Non Conveniens, 12 IPRax 183, 184 (1992).
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such an action against a third party under Article 6(2) is appropriate.
The only qualification is that the effectiveness of the Brussels Convention should not thereby be prejudiced.
It is tempting to find in Zeehaghe an echo of the problem raised in
Harrods,because of the ambiguity surrounding what amounts to a matter
of procedure in this context. More precisely, if the staying of actions is a
procedural matter, and if procedural matters are saved from the Convention, it might look as though Zeehaghe preserves the ability of E.C.
courts to stay proceedings under their existing rules. Closer inspection
suggests otherwise, however, and the fact that no reliance was placed
upon it in Harrods might be justified.
The gravamen of the Zeehaghe decision is that an E.C. country's
courts may stay proceedings, even when the Convention applies, by reference only to procedural rules of a non-jurisdictional nature. Such
courts may thus dismiss proceedings in accordance with rules going to
the admissability of particular claims, as distinct from rules ofjurisdiction. What they may not do, however, is substitute their own rules of
jurisdictional competence for those of the Convention, nor may they dismiss proceedings on the ground that another E.G. forum is more appropriate. Thus, in Zeehaghe itself, the Dutch court would not have been
able to deny that it had jurisdiction over the third party under Article
6(2). Nor could it have said that Germany, the country of the third
party's domicile, was a more appropriate location for proceedings
against it. What the Dutch court could do, however, was refuse to allow
Hagen to introduce a co-defendant on the basis that to do so would
increase the complexity and duration of Zeehaghe's action against
Hagen (as long as such complexity and duration were not attributable to
the fact that the third party was domiciled in Germany, not the
Netherlands).
What this amounts to in the English context is that a court could not
deny its jurisdiction under the Convention in a case, for example, in
which the defendant is English-domiciled. Nor could it stay proceedings
in such a case on the basis that the courts in, say, France, were more
appropriate. It would be open for an English court, however, to dismiss
proceedings in which it has jurisdiction under the Convention on the
ground that the proceedings are, for example, frivolous, vexatious or an
abuse of the process of the court. 78 To dismiss proceedings on such a
basis is not a reflection on the court's jurisdiction but on the admissibility of the plaintiff's claim.
There are then two reasons why Zeehaghe might not have assisted
the majority shareholder in Harrods. First, and perhaps conclusively, any
argument from Zeehaghe is somewhat eclipsed in Harrods by the point
that the Brussels Convention is simply inapplicable as against courts in
non-E.C. countries. Secondly, Zeehaghe does not speak to the appropri78. Rules of the Supreme Court Order 18, Rule 19(1); see LAWRENCE
ACr 1982 45-46 (1983).
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ateness of proceeding in one country or another, but only to the procedural rules a forum can employ to refuse to admit certain claims. In the
end, therefore, it is not clear that the result in Harrods would have been
different had the parties addressed the implications either of Article 16
or of Zeehaghe. But in a case of such importance it is disappointing that
such matters were apparently left unexplored.
C. The Wrong Approach?
Correct though the decision might be, it is arguable that the Court of
Appeal should not have attempted to decide the point at issue in Harrods
at all. They should have asked the E.CJ. for a ruling on the matter. It is
certainly singular that the court elected to determine such an important
question on the scope of the Brussels Convention without referring it to
the European Court for a preliminary ruling, as they had the power (but
not the duty) to do. 79 The whole case turned, after all, on the Convention's proper policy and purpose.
It is easy to see why the Court of Appeal took this robust stance. By
denying the necessity of seeking a ruling they were able to give the parties an immediate decision on the question at issue without the delay
and expense a reference might have involved. It is arguable, however,
that the correct approach should have been different.
The Court of Appeal might first have addressed the question
whether England or Argentina was the forum conveniens, a matter which
was only decided subsequently, once it had been determined that the
court had the power to ask the question at all. Only if they had taken the
issue of the better forum first, however, would they have known whether
a ruling was "necessary to enable it to give judgement," which is the
Convention's criterion for deciding whether a ruling should be
sought.8 0 Had they determined at that stage that England was theforum
conveniens there would, indeed, have been no need to refer the question
of the Convention's scope to Luxembourg. In that event it would have
made no difference to the outcome of the proceedings which view they
took as to the scope of the Convention; the defendant would have lost
whether there was a discretion to stay or not and for that reason a decision on the question of the Convention's scope would have been
unnecessary.

Had the Court of Appeal decided at the outset, however, that
Argentina was the forum conveniens, then everything would have turned
on the extent of the court's power to stay proceedings in a Brussels Convention case. A decision on that question would have been required in
order to reach a conclusion, and a preliminary ruling therefore should
79. Protocol on the Interpretation by the Court ofJustice of the Convention of 27
September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, June 3, 1971, art. 3, 1978 J.O. (L 304) 1, 29 I.L.M. 1439.
80. Id. art. 2. Presumably, the same can be said of the approach of the House of
Lords which referred the questions of law in Harrods to the E.CJ. without apparently
considering the forum convenens issue.

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol 26

have been sought. There is, of course, some force to the contrary view
that a court can only exercise a power once it has decided it has the
power at all. But pragmatism, not logic, nornally governs the order in
which points are argued and determined.
D. An Unfocused Approach
It is unfortunate that the Court of Appeal made no attempt to disengage
the several discrete issues raised by the question whetherforum non conveniens should surrender to the Brussels Convention. They assumed that
the point in contention was whether the doctrine should always remain
alive, opposite a non-E.C. forum, whenever an English court has jurisdiction under the Convention. Instead of posing such an all-or-nothing
question, the court might have addressed three, more focused issues:
(1) Is there a difference between a case in which both parties are E.C.domiciled and one in which this is true only of the defendant? Suppose
a defendant is English-domiciled under Article 2 but argues for a stay of
proceedings on the ground that a non-E.C. country is the better forum.
Is there a difference in such a case between proceedings where the plaintiff is E.C.-domiciled and those where the plaintiff is not? Arguably, it
would be odd to deprive a Community plaintiff, but not a non-European
plaintiff, of its primafacie right to sue here. Shouldforum non conveniens be
retained, therefore, in the latter case but not the former? (2) Does the
survival of forum non ,conveniens depend on the precise ground upon
which an English court assumes jurisdiction? Arguably there is a difference between a case in which the courts' jurisdiction is exclusive, under
Article 16 and 17 of the Convention, and where it is not, as under Article 2. (3) Does the survival of the traditional power to stay proceedings
depend on the precise ground on which the stay is sought? Is a case
where there is a foreign jurisdiction agreement different from one
involving lis alibi pendens and, are such cases different again from one in
which neither of those special features is present but a defendant is
claiming merely that a foreign court is more appropriate? The fact that
the Court of Appeal conflated these situations is regrettable because it is
sometimes claimed that the staying of actions in England should be permissible, since the advent of the Brussels Convention, in the first and
second such case, but not in the third.
Although little in the end would have turned on such fine-tuning in
Harrods itself, it is still disappointing that the Court of Appeal took such
a broad-brush approach to a potentially complex issue. Certainly, it is to
be hoped that the subtle wording of the questions referred to the European Court by the House of Lords will give the Court the opportunity to
address these issues more comprehensively and in a more focused
fashion.
E. The Domicile Point
In assessing whether the forum conveniens was in England or Argentina,
none of the members of the Court of Appeal attached any particular
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weight to the fact that Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd. was a company domiciled in England. Yet the English courts had jurisdiction in Harrods
under the Brussels Convention precisely because the company was English-domiciled and because Article 2 therefore applied. This omission
begs important questions about the sensitivity of the forum conveniens
doctrine to the special circumstances of the Brussels Convention, to
which we must now turn.
VI. Convention Jurisdiction and the Forum Conveniens
The fact that Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd. was English-domiciled is significant in several ways. Most obviously, domicile is a principal ground
of jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention. It might have been
expected that the court would have paid more respect to the Convention
by recognizing that, in the Convention's terms, England was primafacie
the appropriate forum. That they did not is surprising, but it is also
disappointing. After all, in a case such as Harrods,which poses the question of the relationship between jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention and the staying of actions at common law, it is necessarily the case
that the court will have jurisdiction under the Convention, probably
because the defendant is English-domiciled. By respecting this inevitable fact, however, when assessing the location of theforum conveniens, it
might be possible to achieve some equilibrium between the Convention
and the common law.
A.

Convention-led Discretion: The Cases

A special approach to the doctrine offorum conveniens in cases where the
court's jurisdiction is founded on the Brussels Convention would
involve recognizing a presumption-rebuttable, of course-that England is primafade the natural forum if the defendant is English domiciled. This is entirely consistent with the way in which English courts, as
we have seen, already build defacto presumptions as to the appropriate
forum into their treatment of particular types of cases. Moreover,
Hobhouse and Potter JJ. have already shown how such an approach
might be developed. As the latter said in Arkwright, when considering
the location of theforum conveniens:
In considering the exercise of the court's discretion in this case, I start by
reminding myself that the dispute is one involving the meaning and effect
of a reinsurance contract made in the London market which is, on first
impression at least, peculiarly appropriate to trial in this court. It is also a
dispute which the Convention plainly81
regards as appropriatefor decision in the courts
of the defendant reinsurers' domicile.
81. [1990] 3 W.L.R. 705, 720 (Eng. Q.B. 1989) (emphasis added). More fragile

authority for this approach is Banco Atlantico S.A. v. British Bank of the Middle East
[1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 504 (Eng. C.A.), in which Bingham LJ. remarked that "it must
be rare that a corporation resists suit in its domiciliary forum. Rarely would this
court refuse jurisdiction in such a case." Id. at 510. Despite the reference to domicile, however, the relevance of the Brussels Convention to the case seems not to have
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Hobhouse J. was, if anything, more explicit in Berisford. He noted that
there were two factors which strongly suggested that England was the
correct forum. One was the fact that the contract in Berisford contained
an English jurisdiction clause.8 2 The other was that the Brussels Convention so indicated. As he said:
The Convention is, and is intended to be, a codified scheme to make
provision for cases to be tried in appropriate fora if, contrary to my decision in this case, the Convention does leave room for a relevant discretion, there nevertheless must be some very weighty factor to displace the jurisdiction
providedfor by the Convention and considered by the Convention to be the appropriatejurisdiction.8 3

In other words, the fact that an English court has jurisdiction under the
Convention is a strong reason to regard England as theforum conveniens.
This position was more recently endorsed by Parker LJ.in Owens
Bank v. Bracco.8 4 One aspect of that somewhat unusual case concerned
whether the courts in England or in Italy were the more appropriate to
decide whether a judgment rendered in the courts of St. Vincent was
tainted by fraud. It had been argued that the English court should, in its
discretion, stay proceedings for the judgment's enforcement because
the question of fraud was already before the Italian courts. Speaking of
the factors that might influence an English court's decision whether or
not to grant a stay, Parker LJ. remarked: "Although ... this is not a

[Brussels] Convention case, both the United Kingdom and Italy are,...
parties to the 1968 Convention. In our judgment the English courts
should adopt a communautaire, and not a national and chauvinistic
'8 5
approach to the determination of this question."
Such an approach toforum non conveniens also enjoys near-direct support in the Court of Appeal's earlier decision inJames North Ltd v. North
Cape Ltd.8 6 This concerned, inter alia, whether on the facts an English
court should exercise its discretion to allow service of process on a Scottish-domiciled defendant in proceedings for breach of contract. Scotland being a distinct law-area, the question, in effect, was one of
international jurisdiction and the result of permitting service would have
been to give the English court jurisdiction over the defendant. At the
been considered; the Harrods point was apparently never taken by the plaintiffs and
even the Court of Appeal may have assumed that its competence was based on the
pre-Convention ground of service within the jurisdiction. Id. at 505.
82. Not only was the defendant deemed domiciled in England under Article 2,
England was also the agreed jurisdiction. The existence of such ajurisdiction agreement in an insurance contract attracts the provisions of Articles 12(2) and 17. The
defendant's English domicile made it irrelevant, however, in Berisford to consider the
jurisdiction agreement as a source of jurisdiction, although it was relevant to the
question of theforum conveniens. Berisford, [1990] 3 W.L.R. at 693-95.
83. Id. at 702 (emphasis added).
84. [1992] 2 W.L.R. 127 (Eng. C.A. 1991).
85. Id. at 155 (citing in support the words of Bingham, L.J. in Re Harrods (Buenos
Aires), Ltd., [1991] 3 W.L.R. at 418, although they were not specifically directed to the
issue of ascertaining theforum conveniens).
86. [1984] 1 W.L.R. 1428 (Eng. C.A.).
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time the issue arose, the Brussels Convention was not yet in force in the
United Kingdom, nor was the Modified Convention,8 7 whereby jurisdiction is now allocated between England and Scotland along similar lines.
In deciding to permit extraterritorial service against the defendant, thus
allowing the plaintiff to sue in England, Stephenson LJ. had no doubt
that it was correct to take account of the fact that, had the Brussels and
Modified Conventions been in force, the plaintiff would have had a right
primafacie to proceed in England. Had the Conventions been operative,
the English court would have had jurisdiction under Article 5(1) of the
Modified Convention as England was the place of performance of the
contested contract. Stephenson LJ., with whom Dunn LJ. apparently
agreed, accepted that the court should make allowance for the position
dictated by the Brussels Convention which would shortly be implemented in England. Appealing to the principle of comity, he identified
the importance of acting "in harmony with other countries of the European Economic Community"8 8 as "a matter which we are entitled to
take into account in deciding how discretion should be exercised." 8 9
If the courts in recent cases display a tendency to defer to the Brussels Convention when exercising jurisdictional discretion it is nonetheless important to appreciate the limitations of such a Convention-led
approach to the common law. In The Siskina,90 for example, the issue
was whether an English court can only grant interim relief when it has
trial jurisdiction over the substance of a dispute. An argument against
such a limitation was that Article 24 of the Brussels Convention, not
then in force in the United Kingdom, expressly provides that a court in
one E.C. country may grant interlocutory relief even if, under the Convention, another E.C. country's courts have jurisdiction as to substance,
but not those of the state where such relief is sought. Lord Denning, in
the Court of Appeal, was persuaded by the need for the courts to anticipate legislation on their own initiative and themselves attempt to harmonize English law with that of the E.C. The Italian courts had trial
jurisdiction and, had the Brussels Convention been in force in England,
Article 24 would have allowed the English courts to freeze the defendant's English assets. 9 1 This communautaire approach was rejected, however, by the House of Lords. As Lords Diplock9 2 and Hailsham 93 said, it
was for Parliament, or at least the Supreme Court Rules Committee, but
not for the courts, to change the law in such a fashion.
Instructive as they are, however, the objections to following the
Brussels Convention which prevailed in The Siskina are no obstacle to the
courts' adopting a Convention-sensitive approach to jurisdictional dis87. Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982, supra note 6, ch. 27, Sched. 4.
88. North, [1984] 1 W.L.R. at 1434.
89. Id. at 1434.

90.
91.
92.
93.

[1979] 1 App. Gas. 210 (appeal taken from Eng.).
Id. at 233-34.
Id. at 258-59.
Id. at 262-63.
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cretion. One argument, for example, in favour of treating the court with
jurisdiction under the Convention as presumptively the forum conveniens,
is that it would be inconsistent for an English court to treat such a court
as the "appropriate" forum when it applies the Convention (i.e. vis-a-vis
an E.C. country), but not otherwise (i.e. vis-A-vis a non-E.C. country).
This could not have been a consideration in The Siskina, however,
because the Brussels Convention was not in force in England at the
time. More importantly, the communautaire argument in The Siskina
involved more than merely exercising jurisdictional discretion in a particular way. If successful, it would have led to a substantive change to
the Supreme Court Rules which expressly denied interim relief in the
absence of trial jurisdiction. Only legislation or a change in the rules
could have achieved that. By contrast, to respect the policies of the
Brussels Convention when exercising jurisdictional discretion is merely
to take account of all the circumstances of a given case, which is entirely
consistent with the proper exercise of such discretion.
B.

Convention-led Discretion in Principle

Whatever the state of the authorities, however, the final justification for
a communautairehandling offorum non conveniens lies in the doctrine itself.
Indeed, it is arguably what it requires or, at least, permits in a case such
as Harrods. In a case involving the staying of actions, as we have seen,
the search for theforum conveniens proceeds in two stages. 9 4 First, a court
will identify the natural forum, which is usually said to be that with which
the dispute has the most real and substantial connection. If the natural
forum is abroad, English proceedings will normally be stayed. If, however, a plaintiff can demonstrate that it would not be in the interests of
justice to deprive him or her of the opportunity to sue in England, a
court may proceed in one of two ways. Either it will refuse a stay,
notwithstanding that the natural forum is elsewhere, or it will grant a
stay subject to the defendant's waiver of the particular advantages he
would otherwise enjoy in the foreign forum.
Applying these well-established principles in the present context,
the argument for a Convention-led approach to forum non conveniens
might proceed in various ways. On the one hand, but without conviction, it could be said that if a defendant is English-domiciled, that suggests that England is the natural forum. More convincingly, it could be
argued that, even if the natural forum is abroad, the second limb of the
doctrine permits a court to refuse a stay in the interests ofjustice, other
things being equal, whenever the defendant is domiciled in England.
There are three possible routes to such a conclusion. It could be
argued, first, that it would be unjust to deny a plaintiff's right to sue
under the Convention; second, that to dismiss proceedings would defeat
a plaintiff's legitimate expectations; and third, that to do so would
unfairly disadvantage a plaintiff as regards the execution of judgments.
94. Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., [1986] 3 W.L.R. 972 (Eng. H.L.).
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Rights and Justice

It could be said that it would be unjust to prevent a plaintiff from suing
an English-domiciled defendant in England because to do so would
infringe the plaintiff's right to proceed in England under the Convention. Such an argument does not ring true in the English context, however, for two reasons. First, it is the essence of the English approach to
the staying of actions that a plaintiff's primafacie right to sue in England
is apt to be abridged. Secondly, it is arguable that the correct characterization of the plaintiff's position, adopting the traditional common law
position that rights follow remedies, is that a plaintiff only has a right to
litigate in England once a court has exercised its discretion not to stay
the proceedings.
2. Justice and Expectations
There is, however, a more compelling way to express the deprivation a
plaintiff will suffer in a Convention case in which the proceedings are
stayed. It could be said that such a stay would defeat a plaintiff's legitimate expectation that plaintiffs can pursue English-domiciled defendants in England. Such an argument might be unusual in the present
context but there seems no reason why it should not be attempted.
After all, given that justice is said to be the overarching consideration in
forum conveniens cases, 95 it is hard to see how an argument based on the
fairness of depriving a plaintiff of a legitimate expectation might be
resisted on grounds of principle. Moreover, even if it seems unlikely
that an English court would refuse a stay merely to vindicate a plaintiff's
expectations, it is possible to imagine how such an argument might be
buttressed and made more credible. What if the plaintiff, relying on the
defendant's English domicile, had refrained from insisting on including
an English jurisdiction clause in a contract between them thereby sacrificing a more or less secure ground on which to establish jurisdiction?
What if, relying on Article 2 of the Convention, the plaintiff had failed to
start proceedings in the only alternative forum, in which forum any proceedings would now be time-barred? In such cases it is not merely that
the plaintiff has an expectation that an English court will assume jurisdiction; it is that the plaintiff has relied thereon, thus making it unfair to
deprive the plaintiff of the opportunity to sue in England.
3. Judgment andJuridicalAdvantage
Beyond such jurisprudential concerns, however, there might be, in some
circumstances, a more robust way of preventing a stay of English proceedings in a case such as Harrods. It has long been accepted that a
plaintiff can avoid a stay if, by having to proceed in a foreignforum conveniens, that plaintiff would be deprived of a significant juridical advantage. 9 6 Being subject to a time-bar abroad, or being denied the
95. Id. at 991 (per Lord Goff).
96. Id
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opportunity to recover costs in the event of victory are examples.
Another, equally significant juridical disadvantage might afflict a plaintiff
who is deprived of the opportunity to pursue an English-domiciled
defendant in England. Suppose a plaintiff proceeds in England and
obtains judgment there. Such a judgment will enjoy more or less automatic recognition and enforcement in the courts of other E.C. countries
by virtue of the Brussels Convention's enforcement provisions. 97 If,
however, a plaintiff is obliged to obtain judgment in the courts of, say,
New York, because the English proceedings were stayed, that judgment
will only be enforceable in E.C. countries according to their traditional
rules of recognition. These rules may well be more cumbersome or less
easily satisfied than the Convention's simplified regime.
It might be possible to express the plaintiff's difficulty in such a case
in terms of expectations; plausibly, a plaintiff in dispute with an E.C.domiciled defendant can expect to take advantage of the Convention's
enforcement provisions in the event of obtaining judgment. In more
familiar idiom, however, we might say that if English proceedings were
stayed the plaintiff would suffer a juridical disadvantage. If that were so
an English court in such a case might decline to stay its proceedings.
Alternatively, it might do so but only if the defendant were to undertake,
in the event of losing, to satisfy the judgment, thereby removing the
need for enforcement proceedings. 98 In either event, the doctrine of
forum non conveniens would be able to reflect the special circumstances of
the Brussels Convention; the fact that the English court had jurisdiction
under the Convention would justify treating it as theforum conveniens.
C. Convention-led Discretion: The Advantages
By whatever means the jurisdictional discretion is made to accommodate
the special features of Brussels Convention cases, such an approach has
a number of advantages.
1.

Hard Cases

One advantage of such an approach is that it accommodates some difficult cases which would otherwise be hard to handle since Harrods. Take
for instance the situation 9 9 in which a French-domiciled plaintiff wishes
to proceed in England against an English-domiciled defendant for a tort
committed in, say, New York. At first sight, an English court following
Harrods would have the opportunity to stay the proceedings on the basis
97. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, tit. III. An English judgment would be
enforceable under the Convention whether the court assumed jurisdiction under the
Convention or the traditional regime. In principle, the present argument might
apply in either event.
98. As happened in the U.S.A. in Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories, 510 F. Supp. I
(E.D. Pa. 1980). The mere fact that, by having to obtain judgment abroad, a plaintiff
would have to commence enforcement proceedings in England is unlikely to constitute a juridical disadvantage such that a stay would be refused.
99. Briggs, Forum Non Conveniens and the Brussels Convention, Again, supra note 77, at

180, 181.
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that New York was the forum conveniens. Indeed, there is every reason to
suppose that it would do so on the basis that the place of the tort is
usually theforum conveniens. 0 0 That would be a singular, even absurd,
result, however, given that both parties are "European." But it could be
avoided by saying that English law is the forum conveniens on the ground
that only a Brussels Convention country could be the natural forum in
such a case. Alternatively, a stay in such a case could be prevented by
invoking the second limb of the Spiliada test, which halts a stay which
would be unjust to the plaintiff. It could be said that it would be especially unjust to deprive a Brussels Convention plaintiff of the opportunity to sue a Brussels Convention defendant in the courts of a Brussels
Convention country whose courts plainly have jurisdiction under Article
2.
2.

The Decisions Explained

A Convention-sensitive approach to the staying of actions under England's traditional rules also illuminates and explains the actual results
obtained in Arkwright, Berisford and Harrods. It suggests that Hobhouse
and Potter JJ. were correct to indicate that they would have refused a
stay in each of the earlier cases, had they accepted that they had this
power. In Berisford, England was the natural forum, partly because the
defendant was English-domiciled but, more compellingly, because there
was an English jurisdiction clause; 10 ' in Arkwright it was because the
defendant was English-domiciled. More interestingly, however, it suggests that the Court of Appeal in Harrods was also right to grant a stay,
notwithstanding that the company was domiciled in England. There are
several reasons for this. First, although the company was domiciled in
England, its operations and everything about the facts of the case, were
plainly connected with Argentina. The company's business was entirely
carried on there, the relevant documents, including the company's
accounts, were in Spanish, and most of the witnesses were Spanishspeaking. Moreover, as may often happen with the domicile of corporations under the Convention, the company had no real connection with
England. It was English-domiciled merely because it was incorporated
there.' 0 2 Respect for the Brussels Convention could hardly have justified calling England the forum conveniens in such a case. Second, given
the company's close connection with Argentina, could the petitioners
have argued with any credibility that they expected England to be the
only forum in which it might be dissolved? Third, as it is hard to conceive how the petitioners might have wished to invoke the Brussels Convention's enforcement provisions in such a case, there is no room in
Harrods for relying on that particular species of juridical disadvantage.
100. Cordoba Shipping Co. Ltd. v. National State Bank, Elizabeth, New Jersey,

[1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 91 (Eng. C.A.).
101. See Berisford, [1990] 3 W.L.R. at 688.
102. Civil jurisdiction and judgments Act, 1982, supra note 6, ch. 27, § 42(3).
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Finally, there is an especially potent reason for ignoring the com-

pany's English domicile in Harrods. Although it was domiciled in England, Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd. was also domiciled in Argentina
according to the Brussels Convention. More precisely, Section 42(3) of
the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 provides that a corporation is domiciled in England pursuant to the Convention either if it is
incorporated and has an office there, or if its central management and
control is exercised there.10 3 Section 42(6) applies exactly the same
considerations, however, in determining whether a corporation is domiciled in a non-Contracting State. Thus, Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd.
was domiciled in England because it was incorporated there. But it was
also domiciled in Argentina because, as the Court of Appeal and both
parties agreed, its management and control was exercised there. Normally it would not matter that an English-domiciled corporation is also
domiciled in a non-contracting state since English domicile at once confers jurisdiction upon the English courts. In the present context, however, the importance of identifying such a dual domicile is that domicile
per se immediately falls away as a decisive consideration in locating the
forum conveniens. In such a case there is every justification for disregarding the fact that England has jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention
when staying the proceedings at common law.
3.

The Parties' Expectations Again

In the end, however, the most compelling reason for adopting a Convention-sensitive account of the doctrine offorum non conveniens is that it
allows us to deal with a superficially attractive argument against the
Court of Appeal's position in Harrods. It is sometimes said that jurisdictional discretion is incompatible with the Convention because the Convention gives each party an absolute, indefeasible, right to sue, or to be
sued in a contracting state which has jurisdiction. 104
This alluring line of argument encounters immediate difficulties,
however. On the one hand, it is unclear who precisely may claim such a
right to litigate somewhere under the Convention. It hardly makes
sense to accord a right to be sued in England to defendants in a case like
Harrods, even if they are domiciled there under Article 2. As English
proceedings will be the very thing they are trying to avoid by demanding
a stay, it stretches credulity to argue that they have-or would wish to
have-a "right" to be sued in England under the Convention. Again,
even if an English defendant would prefer to be sued in England rather
than in, say, New York, there is no sense in which the doctrine offorum
non conveniens could interfere with any right the defendant might claim to
be sued in England. This is for the obvious reason that the doctrine will
103. Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, supra note 6.
104. If the Convention itself would allocate preferential jurisdiction to another

contracting state, for example pursuant to Articles 5, 16, 17 or 21, then a plaintiff
would only have a right to proceed in the Court thus allocated.
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not be in play at all in such a case unless the defendant invokes it; Eng-

lish courts do not decline jurisdiction of their own motion.
Again, even if it means merely that a plaintiff has a right under the
Convention to sue an English domiciliary in England, this begs an awkward question: is such a right enjoyed by all plaintiffs in English proceedings or only those who are themselves domiciled in an E.C.
country? The question arises because the Preamble to the Convention
speaks of the need to "strengthen in the community the legal protection
of persons therein established."105 This suggests that the scope of an
English court's power to stay proceedings should be defined so as to
allow only E.C.-domiciled plaintiffs an absolute right to sue an Englishdomiciled defendant in England. This would not mean, of course, that
only an E.C. plaintiff could bring proceedings in England against an
English-domiciled defendant. It would mean, however, that such a
plaintiff, protected by its right to sue, would not be exposed to the risk
of such proceedings being stayed on the basis that a non-E.C. court is
the forum conveniens. A non-E.C. plaintiff, however, perhaps a U.S. corporation, lacking an absolute right to sue in England, would be so
exposed.
Such a discriminatory approach is not entirely without merit.
Indeed, as we have seen, insofar as E.C. plaintiffs might have a relatively
stronger claim to sue in an E.C. court than anyone else, there are
grounds for favoring them in identifying the forum conveniens in cases
such as Harrods. U.S. Federal practice explicitly follows this course,
favouring U.S. plaintiffs over others in deciding whether to stay U.S.
proceedings.1 0 6 Such a preference for a "local" plaintiff, however, is
merely a matter of degree where the identity of the forum conveniens is
concerned. It does not involve giving such persons an unfettered right
to sue, while insisting that "foreign" plaintiffs should face the risk that
their actions might be stayed. It would be alarmingly Euro-centric if
such a position were accepted as correct and, if a rights-based argument
is to be mounted at all, it must surely extend to all plaintiffs.
Even if this difficulty is surmounted, however, the argument that a
plaintiff in English proceedings has an absolute right to sue an English
domiciliary in England, as a criticism of the Court of Appeal's decision
in Harrods, is fatally circular. The petitioner in Harrods can be said to
have a right to proceed in England under the Convention only if in fact
an English court has no power to stay or dismiss its proceedings in such
a case. But if the contrary is true, and the English courts enjoy such a
power, then no such right exists. This, however, is the very point at
105. See supra note 65.
106. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). At one time, before
The Spiliada put the law on a more objective footing, it was assumed that it would
amount to a juridical disadvantage for an English plaintiff to be deprived of the
opportunity to sue in England: MacShannon v. Rockware Glass Ltd. [1978] App.
Gas. 795, 819 (Eng.) (appeal taken from Eng.); The Wladyslaw Lokietek [1978] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 520, 540 (Eng. Q.B.).
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issue in the case. It is hardly a criticism of the Court of Appeal, therefore, to say that the Court ignored the petitioner's right to sue when the
very question in dispute was whether such a right existed. In the same
way, it would be bootstrap reasoning at its least attractive to suggest that
the European Court should find the Court of Appeal to have been
wrong on the ground that the petitioners have an absolute right to proceed in England; whether they have such a right is the very question the
E.CJ. has to answer by reference to the Convention's policy and
purpose.
It becomes difficult, therefore, to allege that a plaintiff has a right to
proceed against an English domiciliary in England. This does not mean,
however, in light of the fact that an English court has primafacie jurisdiction in such a case, that such a plaintiff might not have a legitimate expectation that he or she should be able to litigate in England. Indeed, as we
have observed, the fact that a plaintiff might properly have such an
expectation may well mean that it would be unfair to deprive him or her
of the opportunity to sue in England. The perfect mechanism by which
to vindicate such an expectation, however, is the doctrine offorum non
conveniens, the operation of which is always subject to the condition that
it must not be unjust to a plaintiff for his action to be stayed. Once again
it seems that the objectives of the Brussels Convention are better served
by the survival of the jurisdictional discretion of the English courts than
by its abolition. Once again it seems that by taking a Convention-sensitive approach to forum conveniens, we might defuse hostility to Harrods.
VII. Harrods in the European Court
Very shortly, the European Court of Justice will have the onerous
responsibility of resolving the questions referred to it by the House of
Lords in Harrods. When it does so it will not be concerned with the merits of the dispute but with providing a definitive interpretation of the
Brussels Convention. It will then be for the House of Lords to give
judgment in the light of that interpretation.
If, by their interpretation of the Convention, the European Court
were to abolish or circumscribe the jurisdictional discretion of the English courts in determining the issue raised in Harrods, the implications
would be serious. At one extreme, the Court might rule that no contracting state has the power to stay proceedings on the basis that they
should be heard elsewhere, once they have assumed jurisdiction under
the Convention. Such a view would have far-reaching effects, not merely
for English law, but for all those E.C. countries which have traditional
rules for the staying of actions. Indeed, it is unlikely that the Court
would favour such a politically awkward stance.
A less extreme posture would be for the Court to rule that discretionary grounds for the staying of actions are inconsistent with the Brussels Convention although non-discretionary grounds are permissible.
On such a view, it would be acceptable automatically to stay proceedings
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because of the existence of a foreign jurisdiction agreement, or of a lis
alibi pendens abroad, but not otherwise. Such a compromise position
would confine the direct impact of the ruling to England, but in the English context the consequences would nonetheless be draconian. In the
short term, it would deprive the English courts of any power to stay proceedings vis-d-vis non-contracting states even where ajurisdiction agreement or a lis alibi pendens is present. This is because jurisdictional
discretion is the vehicle by which all stays of proceedings are effected in
England and it would not be open for an English court, much less the
E.CJ., to invent non-discretionary rules for the staying of actions in
cases involving foreign jurisdiction clauses or pending actions abroad.
In practical terms, if the E.C.J. were to rule that a contracting state may
only stay actions vis-d-vis non-E.C. countries on grounds which reflect
the principles examined in Articles 16, 17 and 21, English legislation
would be required to bring English law into line with the Convention.
A weaker position would be for the European Court to distinguish
cases in which an English court enjoys exclusive jurisdiction under Articles 16 and 17 from those in which a defendant is domiciled in England
under Article 2. They might rule that discretion can be employed only
in the latter situation. Although such a view has the attraction of compromise, it is conceptually unsatisfying. In particular, if the Convention
is meant to operate only between E.C. countries, there is no justification
for deferring to an English court's exclusive jurisdiction in a case where
the appropriate forum is in a non-E.C. country.
Alternatively, the European Court might make something of the reference in the Brussels Convention's Preamble to the need to
"strengthen in the community the position of persons therein established." We have observed that, in the present context, it is hard to
argue from this principle that defendants should be entitled to be sued
in the place of their domicile. Indeed, the protection for E.C. defendants would hardly be strengthened by depriving them of the opportunity
to argue for a stay of proceedings brought against them in England. In
relation to E.C.-domiciled plaintifJs, however, the Preamble might be put
to better use. In particular, we have seen that an E.C. plaintiff might
have a special claim, in terms of fairness and common sense, to sue an
English-domiciled defendant in England. In such a situation it would be
possible, in accordance with the Preamble, for the European Court to
protect an E.G. plaintiff by depriving the English courts of any power to
stay such proceedings, while preserving such a power in cases involving
non-E.C. plaintiffs. Such an outcome is, however, unattractive. A curtailment of the English court's power to grant a stay would be detrimental to English domiciliaries and so, in that sense, actually contrary to the
Convention's Preamble. It would also discriminate against non-E.C.
plaintiffs who would have to face the possibility of having their actions in
England stayed, a consequence which plaintiffs outside the E.C. would
hardly greet with equanimity. There is, however, a more equitable and
more flexible way to safeguard the interests of E.G. plaintiffs without
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discriminating against non-E.C. plaintiffs. This could be achieved by
preserving the English courts' discretion to grant a stay, while allowing
the courts to reflect a plaintiff's European identity in their determination of the appropriate forum.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is important to reprise and emphasize the two principal
themes of the foregoing remarks. The first of these is the compatibility
of England's traditional jurisdictional regime with that of the Brussels
Convention. The second is the desirability of incorporating respect for
the Convention into the operation of the English approach.
A.

Two Compatible Regimes

In the light of the options before the European Court, the rejection of
forum non conveniens is an unappealing prospect. Fortunately, a number
of arguments favor its retention. We have seen, for example, how
unlikely it is that the framers of the Convention could have intended to
abolish completely the traditional staying rules of contracting states.
Again, if predictability and certainty are considerations, we have seen
how the English approach is less troublesome in this respect than is
sometimes supposed. First and foremost, however, the Brussels Convention itself does not compel the abolition of the doctrine in Convention cases. This is because, in several ways, the English approach is
entirely consistent with the Convention's aspirations. Most importantly,
the English doctrine is compatible with the two principal aims of the
Brussels Convention as set out in its Preamble. First, as the Court of
Appeal said in Harrods,10 7 the primary purpose of the Convention is to
provide a common regime for the mutual recognition of judgments as
between E.C. countries. The Convention's jurisdictional rules are
intended to serve that goal by harmonising the law of E.C. countries so
as to remove the possibility of concurrent proceedings, and thus conflictingjudgments, in more than one E.C. country. But, true to that purpose, they have no role where the question is whether the English courts
or those of a non-E.C. country should entertain proceedings. Indeed, it
is hard to see how rules concerning the dismissal of proceedings could
lead to the danger of inconsistent judgments when the result of such
dismissal is to prevent their being an English judgment at all.
Second, the survival of English law's traditional jurisdictional rules
is no threat to the Convention's other stated goal, to strengthen the
legal protection of persons established in the E.C. As we have seen, it is
unclear whether this objective does or should involve discrimination
between E.C. and non-E.C. plaintiffs. The strengthening of an E.C.
party's position, however, need not necessarily be to the exclusion,
much less the detriment, of others. In the present context, therefore, it
107. [1991] 3 W.L.R. at 416 (Dillon L.J.'s remarks).
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is assumed that protection should be extended to all plaintiffs of
whatever origin. This means that all plaintiffs should have the opportunity to sue defendants who are subject to Convention jurisdiction and to
take advantage of the Convention's enforcement rules in the event of
obtaining judgment. More precisely, it implies that, in the event of
doubt, the Convention should be interpreted so as to foster the interests
of E.C. plaintiffs (and others) in this regard.
In reality, however, the English approach does not offer plaintiffs a
weaker alternative to the Convention regarding the opportunity to sue
and to enforcejudgments. On the one hand, if a plaintiff were to sue an
English domiciliary in England the doctrine offorum non conveniens could
easily preserve the plaintiff's position. In some cases an English court
could treat England as presumptively the natural forum and refuse a stay
on that basis. It would be proper, for example, to give special preference to an E.C. plaintiff for whom it may be especially convenient and
economical to sue in England rather than, say, in Hong Kong. Alternatively, even if such a presumption were rebutted on the facts, because
everything apart from the Convention located the natural forum elsewhere, a court could decline to stay proceedings on the basis that to do
so would unjustly disadvantage a plaintiff. Similarly, an English court
could also protect a plaintiff's interests regarding access to the Convention's enforcement regime. As we have seen, the threat to the plaintiff in
this respect is that if forced to sue in, say, New York rather than England, it might find it harder to enforce a New York judgment in, say,
France, than an English judgment, which is virtually guaranteed enforcement under the Convention throughout the E.C. An English court
could protect such a plaintiff, however, albeit indirectly, by insisting that
any dismissal of English proceedings should be subject to the defendant's undertaking to satisfy any judgment obtained against it outside the
E.C.
Furthermore, the English doctrine is perfectly consistent with the
Convention's other implied objectives. Indeed, it follows the Convention's contours in many important ways. In the exercise of its jurisdictional discretion an English court could differentiate, for example,
between the different bases upon which it might assume jurisdiction
under the Convention, thereby reflecting the different classes of jurisdiction contained in the Convention. Thus, it might be more likely to
regard England as theforum conveniens when its jurisdiction is exclusive
under Articles 16 and 17 than if it were merely founded on domicile
under Article 2. Again, the English approach is as sensitive as the Convention to such policies as the avoidance of concurrent proceedings and
showing deference to contractual jurisdiction agreements for, as we
have seen, an English court is very likely to treat a foreign forum as the
forum conveniens when the parties have so agreed, or when proceedings
are substantially underway there. Finally, there is every indication that
the English courts are coming to regard a court which has jurisdiction
under the Brussels Convention as presumptively the forum conveniens.
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Indeed, they are prepared to do so even when they do not regard the
Convention as being directly applicable.
In the light of such considerations it is apparent that the English
approach to jurisdiction has the potential to mirror and to prosecute the
objectives of the Brussels Convention. Indeed, it may provide a more
subtle means of doing so than the Convention itself (it only protects the
position of plaintiffs, for example, where such protection is actually necessary). Moreover, it is important to stress that the English doctrine
offers a means not merely to reflect the Convention's aims, but actually
to extend their scope. For while the Convention does not, or should
not, operate directly in cases involving non-E.C. courts, the doctrine of
forum non conveniens does so. Given that the doctrine embodies the
essential policies of the Convention, this ensures that those policies can
be projected even beyond their strictly allotted range.
It is hard to see, therefore, how the doctrine offorum non conveniens
is inconsistent with the Brussels Convention in its essential particulars;
not only does it reflect the policies of the Convention, it also extends
their scope. Moreover, the significance of this conclusion can hardly be
underestimated, for if, in the end, the English doctrine is compatible
with the Brussels Convention, the only reason to abolish it falls away. If
so, the Court of Appeal's decision in Harrods is ultimately vindicated.
B. A Communautaire Approach Justified
It is apparent that the English approach to jurisdiction reflects, in its
nature, many important policies of the Brussels regime. It is open to
question, however, whether it is desirable deliberately to build respect
for the Brussels Convention into the exercise of the courts' discretion to
stay proceedings in relation to non-Convention courts. After all, such a
view takes for granted that the Convention does not strictly apply in
such cases; it is precisely because it does not that the English courts'
jurisdictional discretion survives at all. It might be asked, therefore, why
an English court, in a case like Harrods, should pay attention to a law
which is inapplicable by definition. Why should it defer to the defendant's domiciliary law when exercising jurisdictional discretion merely
because the Brussels Convention regards it as important?
One answer might be that to do so is adequately justified by the
doctrine of forum non conveniens itself, the operation of which assumes
that all the facts in a case are relevant to determining the just and appropriate forum. Moreover, courts commonly give special weight to certain
facts in particular types of case. It would be no more odd to give presumptive weight to the fact that an English court has jurisdiction under
the Brussels Convention than to the fact that proceedings would be
time-barred abroad, or that a successful plaintiff could not recover costs
in the alternative form, or that the case concerns a lis alibi pendens or a
foreign jurisdiction agreement.
Another response is that consistency alone demands that English
courts should attend to the position under the Brussels Convention in
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exercising their jurisdictional discretion. It is true, of course, that the
law sometimes requires courts to apply inconsistent policies in different
situations. But that does not mean that they should act inconsistently
when they have the choice not to do so, a choice vouchsafed in the present context by the very breadth of their jurisdictional discretion.
There are, however, less technical, more tactical, reasons for incorporating respect for the Brussels Convention into the jurisdictional discretion of the English courts. Such an approach eases the tension
between the competing philosophies of the common law and the Brussels Convention. It also provides a workable modus operandi which reconciles the operation of the two regimes. But, most importantly, it offers
English law's traditional approach to jurisdiction its best defense against
abolition. It is hard to see how the doctrine offorum non conveniens can be
inconsistent with the Brussels Convention, the ultimate test of its survival, if it has the capacity to respect, indeed to extend, the Convention's
policy and purpose.
It must be acknowledged, however, that such a communautaire attitude towardsforum non conveniens, attractive as it is, conceals an arresting
irony. For it means that, far from being a threat to the Brussels Convention, jurisdictional discretion may be its greatest ally.

